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Abstract	28	
Economic	decisions	are	guided	by	highly	subjective	reward	valuations	(SVs).	Often	these	SVs	29	
are	overridden	when	individuals	conform	to	social	norms.	Yet,	the	neural	mechanisms	that	30	
underpin	the	distinct	processing	of	such	normative	reward	valuations	(NV)	are	poorly	31	
understood.	The	dorsomedial	and	ventromedial	portions	of	the	prefrontal	cortex	32	
(dmPFC/vmPFC)	are	putatively	key	regions	for	processing	social	and	economic	information	33	
respectively.	However,	the	contribution	of	these	regions	to	economic	decisions	guided	by	34	
social	norms	is	unclear.	Using	fMRI	and	computational	modelling	we	examine	the	neural	35	
mechanisms	underlying	the	processing	of	SVs	and	NVs.	Subjects	(n	=	15)	indicated	either	36	
their	own	economic	preferences	or	made	similar	choices	based	on	a	social	norm	-	learnt	37	
during	a	training	session.	We	found	that	that	the	vmPFC	and	dmPFC	make	dissociable	38	
contributions	to	the	processing	of	SV	and	NV.	Regions	of	the	dmPFC	processed	only	the	39	
value	of	rewards	when	making	normative	choices.	In	contrast,	we	identify	a	novel	40	
mechanism	in	the	vmPFC	for	the	coding	of	value.	This	region	signalled	both	subjective	and	41	
normative	valuations,	but	activity	was	scaled	positively	for	SV	and	negatively	for	NV.	These	42	
results	highlight	some	of	the	key	mechanisms	that	underpin	conformity	and	social	influence	43	
in	economic	decision-making.	 	44	
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Introduction	45	
Behaviour	 is	 frequently	 driven	 by	 evaluations	 of	 the	 value	 of	 different	 courses	 of	 action	46	
(Kahneman	and	Tversky	1984;	Rushworth	and	Behrens	2008).	In	humans,	these	evaluations	47	
form	 part	 of	 our	 everyday	 lives	 when	 we	 make	 economic	 decisions	 and	 place	 value	 on	48	
behaviours	 that	 result	 in	 rewarding	 outcomes.	 Such	 decisions	 can	 be	 highly	 subjective	49	
(Green	et	al.	1994;	Mazur	2001).	For	example,	whilst	some	people	are	impulsive	and	favour	50	
small	 immediate	 rewards	 to	 larger	delayed	benefits,	others	are	patient	and	prefer	 to	wait	51	
much	longer	in	order	to	obtain	only	slightly	larger	rewards.		52	
The	 neural	 basis	 of	 such	 subjective	 impulsivity	 in	 economic	 decision-making	 is	 becoming	53	
increasingly	 understood	 (McClure	 et	 al.	 2004;	 Kable	 and	 Glimcher	 2007,	 2010;	 Kim	 et	 al.	54	
2008;	Peters	and	Buchel	2009;	Figner	et	al.	2010;	Louie	and	Glimcher	2010).	However,	such	55	
economic	 decisions	 are	 often	 made	 in	 the	 context	 of	 groups	 of	 individuals	 interacting	56	
together.	Within	these	groups	behaviour	is	often	dictated	by	social	norms	which	determine	57	
what	behaviours	are	permissible	or	preferred	(Asch	1956;	Kahneman	and	Miller	1986;	Boyd	58	
et	 al.	 2003;	 Fehr	 and	 Fischbacher	 2004).	 Such	 normative	 preferences	 often	 override	59	
subjective	evaluations,	with	people	 flexibly	 switching	between	making	economic	decisions	60	
based	 on	 subjective	 or	 normative	 valuations.	 However,	 there	 is	 currently	 a	 very	 limited	61	
understanding	of	how	reward	valuations	based	on	normative	preferences	are	recalled	and	62	
influence	activity	in	the	brain	(Izuma	2013;	Ruff	and	Fehr	2014).	How	does	the	brain	process	63	
rewards	that	are	valued	subjectively,	or	through	recalled	social	norms?	64	
The	medial	prefrontal	cortex	(mPFC)	is	understood	to	contribute	to	the	processing	of	social	65	
norm	 information,	 but	 also	 to	 impulsive	 economic	 decision-making	 (Izuma	 2013).	 The	66	
prevailing	 view	 of	 functional	 organisation	 in	 the	 mPFC	 suggests	 that	 these	 functions	 are	67	
localised	to	distinct	zones	of	the	mPFC	(Rudebeck	et	al.	2008).	It	is	often	claimed	that	dorsal	68	
sub-regions	 (DmPFC)	 are	 specialised	 for	 processing	 social	 information,	 whereas	 ventral	69	
portions	 (VmPFC)	 are	 specialised	 for	 processing	 information	 about	 the	 value	 of	 rewards	70	
(Amodio	and	Frith	2006;	Rushworth	and	Behrens	2008).		71	
Anatomical	 evidence	 supports	 the	notion	of	 a	 functional	 dissociation	between	 the	DmPFC	72	
(comprising	areas	BA	6,8	and	9)	and	VmPFC	(area	11	and	32).	These	regions	contain	distinct	73	
cytoarchitectonic	zones	and	each	have	a	distinct	connectional	fingerprint	(Barbas	et	al.	1999;	74	
Cavada	et	al.	2000;	Petrides	and	Pandya	2006,	2007;	Sallet	et	al.	2013;	Neubert	et	al.	2015).	75	
Notably,	 portions	 of	 the	 VmPFC	 are	 strongly	 connected	 to	 regions	 implicated	 economic	76	
decision-making	 but	 have	 weaker	 connections	 to	 areas	 engaged	 when	 processing	 social	77	
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information	(Barbas	et	al.	1999;	Cavada	et	al.	2000;	Petrides	and	Pandya	2006,	2007;	Kable	78	
and	Glimcher	2007;	Sallet	et	al.	2013;	O’Doherty	2014;	Neubert	et	al.	2015).	In	contrast,	sub-79	
regions	 of	 the	 DmPFC	 (Ongur	 et	 al.	 2003;	 Petrides	 and	 Pandya	 2006)	 -	 are	 strongly	80	
connected	 to	areas	of	 the	brain	 that	are	more	 typically	engaged	during	 social	 information	81	
processing	 (Apps	 and	 Sallet,	 2017;	 Barbas	 et	 al.	 1999;	 Cavada	 et	 al.	 2000;	 Petrides	 and	82	
Pandya	 2006,	 2007;	 Behrens	 et	 al.	 2009;	 Kilner	 2011;	Apps	 and	 Tsakiris	 2013;	 Sallet	 et	 al.	83	
2013;	Neubert	et	al.	2015).	Functional	evidence	also	supports	claims	of	a	dissociation	(Frith	84	
and	Frith	2006;	Izuma	2013;	Ruff	and	Fehr	2014).	Portions	of	areas	6,	8	and	9	are	engaged	85	
when	processing	others	intentions	or	mental	states	(Ramnani	and	Miall	2004;	Behrens	et	al.	86	
2008;	Hampton	et	al.	2008;	Gabay	et	al.	2014),	when	learning	what	attitudes	are	normative	87	
(Spitzer	et	al.	2007;	Klucharev	et	al.	2009),	and	when	social	norms	are	violated	(Berthoz	et	al.	88	
2002;	 Spitzer	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Buckholtz	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Prehn	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Buckholtz	 and	Marois	89	
2012).	In	contrast,	the	ventral	portions	of	the	mPFC	(VmPFC),	including	BA	32	and	11	(Ongur	90	
et	al.	2003;	Petrides	and	Pandya	2006),	have	been	shown	to	signal	the	value	of	both	primary	91	
and	 secondary	 reinforcers	 and	 particularly	 in	 processing	 the	 subjective	 value	 of	 economic	92	
rewards	(Kable	and	Glimcher	2007;	Luhmann	et	al.	2008;	Pine	et	al.	2009;	Smith	et	al.	2010;	93	
O’Doherty	2011;	Peters	2011;	Hunt	et	al.	2012;	Strait	et	al.	2014).	Moreover,	damage	to	this	94	
region	in	humans	has	been	linked	to	impulsive	economic	decisions	(Koenigs	et	al.	2010;	Mar	95	
et	al.	2011).		96	
More	recent	evidence	has	cast	doubt	on	whether	there	is	such	a	strong	dissociation.	Studies	97	
examining	 the	 neural	 mechanisms	 that	 underlie	 the	 learning	 of	 another’s	 subjective	98	
valuation	of	a	reward	(Garvert	et	al.	2015),	or	choosing	on	behalf	of	another	based	on	their	99	
preferences	 (Nicolle	 et	 al.	 2012)	 have	 shown	 the	 involvement	 of	 both	 the	 VmPFC	 and	100	
DmPFC.	 They	 found	 that	 both	 the	 DmPFC	 and	 VmPFC	 can	 be	 engaged	 by	 the	 value	 of	 a	101	
reward	according	to	either	ourselves	or	another	person.	However,	these	results	suggest	that	102	
DmPFC	is	engaged	when	this	valuation	is	not	guiding	the	execution	of	one’s	current	actions	103	
(it	 is	engaged	 in	 ‘offline’	valuations)	and	 the	VmPFC	 is	engaged	by	 the	value	guiding	one’s	104	
current	 choices	 (‘online’	 valuation’).	 This	would	 therefore	point	 to	neither	 the	VmPFC	nor	105	
DmPFC	 being	 engaged	 by	 social	 or	 non-social	 information	 specifically.	 However,	 these	106	
decisions	were	made	 either	 to	 reward	 the	 subjects	 themselves,	 or	 one	 other	 person.	 The	107	
mechanisms	that	underlie	how	the	brain	processes	the	value	of	a	reward	when	required	to	108	
conform	to	a	norm	are	unclear.	Moreover,	 it	 is	unclear	how	different	regions	of	 the	mPFC	109	
contribute	to	the	processing	of	both	subjective	and	normative	valuations.	110	
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In	 this	 study	 we	 dissect	 out	 the	 contribution	 of	 different	 regions	 of	 the	mPFC	 to	making	111	
decisions	based	on	subjective	(SV)	and	normative	valuations	(NV).	We	designed	a	paradigm	112	
based	on	previous	delay-discounting	economic	decision-making	 tasks	 that	have	been	used	113	
to	 examine	 subjective	 impulsive	 behaviours	 (Mazur	 2001;	 Kable	 and	 Glimcher	 2007).	114	
Subjects	 made	 inter-temporal	 economic	 decisions	 choosing	 between	 a	 small	 immediate	115	
reward,	and	a	 larger,	delayed	reward.	On	half	of	the	trials	these	choices	were	made	based	116	
on	 their	 subjective	 preferences,	 and	 on	 half	 of	 the	 trials	 they	 were	 made	 based	 on	 a	117	
normative	 valuation	 that	 was	 learnt	 during	 a	 training	 session.	 Using	 this	 design	 in	118	
conjunction	 with	 functional	 magnetic	 resonance	 imaging	 (fMRI)	 and	 computational	119	
modelling,	we	were	able	to	examine	the	contribution	of	different	regions	of	the	mPFC	to	the	120	
processing	of	subjective	or	normative	reward	valuations.		 	121	
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Methods	122	
Subjects	123	
Sixteen	healthy	right-handed	participants	were	screened	for	neurological,	psychiatric	and	124	
psychological	disorders	(ages	18-32;	13	female).	This	study	was	approved	by	the	Royal	125	
Holloway,	University	of	London	Psychology	Department	Ethics	Committee	and	conformed	to	126	
the	regulations	set	out	in	the	CUBIC	MRI	Rules	of	Operation.	We	excluded	participants	who	127	
made	translations	or	rotations	of	>3mm	(or	>3°)	volume	to	volume,	or	subjects	who’s	total	128	
movement	was	greater	than	3mm.	One	(male)	subject	was	excluded	for	failing	to	respond	129	
on	30%	of	the	trials	and	excessive	head	motion.	Subjects	were	paid	for	their	participation	130	
(see	‘payment’	in	supp.	Methods).	Subjects	were	informed	that	a	previous	behavioural	131	
experiment	had	taken	place	with	100	participants.	They	were	told	that	these	participants	132	
received	payment	in	the	same	manner	that	they	had.	However,	in	fact	no	previous	study	133	
was	conducted.		134	
Task	135	
The	aim	of	this	experiment	was	to	examine	the	processing	of	rewards,	the	value	of	which	136	
was	either	discounted	by	temporal	delays	subjectively,	or	in	a	manner	that	conformed	to	a	137	
social	norm.	Subjects	were	engaged	in	the	experiment	over	two	consecutive	days.	On	the	138	
first	day,	subjects	performed	two	tasks.	First	they	indicated	their	own	preferences	on	a	139	
temporal	discounting	task	and	second	they	learnt	by	trial	and	error	what	they	believed	was	140	
normative	preferences	on	a	similar	delay-discounting	task.	Subjects	were	told	that	this	141	
preference	reflected	what	‘at	least	69%	of	people	chose	to	do	in	the	prior	pilot	experiment’.	142	
On	the	second	day,	subjects	performed	similar	trials	of	a	temporal	discounting	task	but	on	143	
half	of	the	trials	they	were	required	to	indicate	their	own	preferences	(Subjective	trials)	and	144	
on	the	other	half	they	were	required	to	conform	to	the	“normative”	preferences	that	they	145	
had	learnt	during	the	training	session	and	not	their	own	preferences.	Although	it	should	be	146	
noted	that	subjects	were	free	to	choose	on	both	types	of	trial.		147	
For	the	temporal	discounting	task,	subjects	were	required	to	choose	between	an	immediate	148	
reward	(£3)	and	a	delayed	reward	that	was	shown	on	the	screen	(sup.	Fig.1	and	Fig.1).	The	149	
magnitude	of	the	delayed	options	were	£3.10,	£3.75,	£5,	£8,	£12	and	£20	and	were	available	150	
at	delays	of	1	day,	15	days,	30	days,	60	days,	100	days	and	180	days.	Thus	there	were	36	151	
different	combinations	of	delay	and	magnitude	that	were	used	as	the	delayed	options.	The	152	
same	options	were	used	in	both	the	training	tasks	and	the	task	inside	the	scanner	in	both	153	
conditions,	although	trials	were	presented	in	different	pseudo-randomised	orders.		154	
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	155	
Payment	156	
Subjects	were	told	that	their	payment	would	be	based	on	their	choice	on	one	trial	each	from	157	
the	normative	or	subjective	trials	during	the	training	or	scanning	session.	This	payment	158	
would	be	determined	by	them	selecting	numbers	at	random	“out	of	a	hat”.	The	number	159	
would	correspond	to	one	of	the	trials	during	the	training	and	scanning	session	and	their	160	
payment	would	be	based	on	whichever	choice	they	indicated	on	that	trial.	This	approach	has	161	
previously	been	used	to	ensure	that	subjects	are	incentivised	to	accurately	indicate	their	162	
preferences	on	all	trials.	Subjects	were	informed	that	they	would	be	paid	by	cheque	for	their	163	
participation.	If	on	the	selected	trial	they	chose	the	delayed	option,	they	would	be	paid	that	164	
higher	reward	value,	but	the	cheque	would	be	dated	such	that	it	could	not	be	cashed	until	165	
the	delay	had	passed.	If	they	chose	the	immediate	option	then	the	cheque	would	be	dated	166	
the	same	day.	All	of	this	information	was	provided	to	the	subjects	before	the	experiment,	167	
thus	subjects	were	aware	that	their	decisions	during	the	experiment	were	real	economic	168	
decisions.	Importantly,	subjects	were	not	rewarded	during	the	training	or	scanning	session	169	
for	making	responses	that	were	congruent	or	incongruent	with	the	norm.	This	was	170	
important,	as	we	did	not	want	subjects	to	associate	making	decisions	on	the	normative	trials	171	
with	any	additional	rewards	–	other	than	that	being	offered	in	association	with	a	delay.	Such	172	
additional	associations	could	have	distorted	behaviour	and	the	processing	of	delayed	173	
rewards	in	the	main	experiment,	as	they	would	only	be	present	in	the	normative	condition	174	
and	not	in	the	subjective	condition.	Subjects	were	told	that	one	trial	from	the	normative	175	
condition	would	be	selected	at	random	and	would	affect	their	payment,	in	exactly	the	same	176	
manner	as	on	the	subjective	trials.	The	subjects	were	not,	therefore,	incentivized	to	conform	177	
but	were	simply	instructed	to	do	so.		This	ensured	that	subjects	believed	that	the	economic	178	
choices	made	during	the	main	tasks	were	the	only	choices	that	influenced	their	payment	for	179	
the	experiment.		180	
	181	
Apparatus	182	
Subjects	lay	supine	in	an	MRI	scanner	(3T	Siemens	Trio,	CUBIC,	Royal	Holloway,	University	of	183	
London)	with	the	fingers	of	the	right	hand	positioned	on	an	MRI-compatible	response	box.	184	
Stimuli	were	projected	onto	a	screen	behind	the	subject	and	viewed	in	a	mirror	positioned	185	
above	the	subjects	face.	Presentation	software	(Neurobehavioral	Systems,	Inc.,	USA)	was	186	
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used	for	experimental	control	(stimulus	presentation	and	response	collection).	A	custom-187	
built	parallel	port	interface	connected	to	the	Presentation	PC	received	transistor-transistor	188	
logic	(TTL)	pulse	inputs	from	the	response	keypad.	It	also	received	TTL	pulses	from	the	MRI	189	
scanner	at	the	onset	of	each	volume	acquisition,	allowing	events	in	the	experiment	to	190	
become	precisely	synchronized	with	the	onset	of	each	scan.	The	timings	of	all	events	in	the	191	
experiment	were	sampled	accurately,	continuously	and	simultaneously	(independently	of	192	
Presentation)	at	a	frequency	of	1	kHz	using	an	A/D	1401	unit	(Cambridge	Electronic	Design,	193	
UK).	Spike2	software	was	used	to	create	a	temporal	record	of	these	events.	Event	timings	194	
were	prepared	for	subsequent	general	linear	model	(GLM)	analysis	of	fMRI	data	(see	event	195	
definition	and	modelling	in	the	main	text).	196	
	197	
Trial	Structure	198	
During	the	scanning	session,	each	trial	began	with	a	trial-type	cue	(either	the	word	“YOU”	or	199	
“GROUP”),	that	indicated	whether	subjects	were	required	to	make	subjective	preferences	200	
(“YOU”)	or	indicate	normative	preferences	(“GROUP”)	on	the	trial.	Following	the	trial-type	201	
cue,	after	a	variable	delay,	an	offer	cue	was	presented	that	indicated	the	magnitude	and	202	
delay	of	the	delayed	option.	After	a	further	variable	delay,	a	trigger	cue	was	presented	203	
where	subjects	were	required	to	indicate	their	choice	(for	full	timings	see	Fig.1).	A	“now”	204	
stimulus	was	used	to	signify	the	£3	immediate	option	and	a	“wait”	stimulus	was	used	for	the	205	
delayed	option.	Subjects	were	required	to	indicate	their	choice	at	the	time	of	the	trigger	206	
cue,	by	pressing	one	of	two	buttons	on	a	keypad.	The	trigger	cue	was	presented	for	1000ms,	207	
any	responses	before	or	after	this	time	period	resulted	in	the	trials	being	classified	as	208	
“missed”	(All	subjects	included	missed	less	than	3%	of	trials).	Subjects	were	instructed	to	209	
press	the	button	that	corresponded	to	“now”	if	the	preference	was	the	£3	immediate	option	210	
or	“wait”	for	the	larger	delayed	option.	In	order	to	prevent	subjects	from	preparing	a	211	
specific	motor	response	at	the	time	of	the	offer	cue,	the	position	of	the	“now”	and	“wait”	212	
stimuli	were	pseudorandomly	organised,	such	that	subjects	could	not	predict	which	button	213	
would	be	“now”	and	which	would	be	“wait”	at	the	time	of	the	offer	cue.	All	stimuli	were	also	214	
colour-coded	to	ensure	that	is	was	clear	whether	a	subjective	or	normative	preference	was	215	
required	on	each	trial.	Yellow	cues	indicated	that	a	normative	choice	should	be	made	and	216	
white	cues	indicated	that	a	subjective	choice	should	be	made.	By	introducing	variable	jitters	217	
between	offer	cues	and	responses	we	decreased	the	possibility	of	finding	reaction	time	218	
related	behavioural	or	neuroimaging	findings,	due	to	extended	and	variable	fore-periods	219	
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before	subjects	indicated	choices.	As	expected,	therefore,	we	found	no	behavioural	effects	220	
on	reaction	times.	221	
	222	
Procedure	223	
Training	224	
Subjects	were	trained	in	two	phases	one	day	prior	to	scanning.	In	the	first	phase	the	subject	225	
was	presented	with	a	series	of	visual	stimuli	on	a	monitor	and	performed	a	series	of	delay-226	
discounting	trials	where	they	were	required	to	indicate	their	own	preferences	between	the	227	
delayed	and	an	immediate	options.	Each	trial	consisted	of	an	offer	cue	(an	amount	of	money	228	
and	a	delay	period)	and	a	trigger	cue	(two	lines	corresponding	to	two	buttons	on	the	229	
keypad,	with	the	words	“wait”	above	one	line	and	“now“	above	the	other	line).	During	this	230	
phase	of	training	subjects	performed	108	trials.	This	stage	of	the	training	enabled	subjects	to	231	
familiarise	themselves	with	performing	delay-discounting	trials.	This	task	allowed	us	to	232	
examine	the	stability	of	subjective	preferences	pre	and	post	the	learning	of	normative	233	
preferences.		234	
	235	
In	the	second	phase	of	training,	subjects	performed	a	task	where	they	learned	the	normative	236	
preferences	for	each	delayed	option.	The	subjects	were	informed	that	a	previous	237	
behavioural	experiment	had	taken	place	with	100	participants	and	that	there	was	always	at	238	
least	69%	agreement	on	whether	people	should	wait	for	the	delayed	reward	or	take	the	239	
immediate	one.	Their	task	was	to	learn	what	this	majority/group	of	people	would	choose	to	240	
do	through	trial	and	error.	Each	trial	consisted	of	a	delayed	offer	cue	and	a	trigger	cue	but	241	
also	an	additional	feedback	cue.	The	feedback	cue	indicated	the	social	norm	preference	for	242	
the	delayed	option	on	each	trial.	The	cue	was	either	the	word	“NOW”	or	“WAIT”,	which	243	
indicated	whether	the	normative	preference	was	for	the	immediate	or	delayed	option	244	
respectively.	Subjects	were	instructed	to	indicate	the	normative	preferences	by	learning	245	
from	the	feedback.	The	normative	preferences	learnt	during	this	session	were	based	around	246	
the	behaviour	of	subjects	during	a	pilot	experiment	(see	“computational	modelling”	below	247	
for	more	details).	During	this	session,	subjects	performed	108	trials,	with	the	same	options	248	
presented	as	during	the	first	phase	of	the	training,	in	a	pseudo-random	order.	During	249	
training	every	subject	correctly	indicated	the	norm	response	at	greater	than	95%	accuracy	250	
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after	the	first	10	trials	during	this	session.	Moreover,	in	the	subsequent	scanning	session,	251	
subjects	performed	a	further	20	trials	of	this	task	with	feedback,	ensuring	that	subjects	252	
learnt	and	recalled	the	norm	during	the	main	experiment	(See	below).	253	
	254	
Scanning	Session	255	
On	the	day	following	the	training	session,	subjects	performed	a	similar	delay-discounting	256	
task	inside	the	MRI	scanner.	There	were	216	pseudorandomly	organised	trials,	108	where	257	
they	indicated	their	own	preference	(subjective	trials)	and	108	where	they	indicated	the	258	
preferences	according	to	the	majority	behaviour	they	had	learnt	during	the	training	259	
(normative	trials).	The	large	number	of	trials,	and	the	parametric	analysis,	were	approaches	260	
employed	that	can	increase	power	to	detect	within-subject	effects	(although	no	formal	261	
power	analysis	was	conducted,	due	to	difficulties	in	interpretation;	Mumford	2012).	In	this	262	
session,	there	was	no	feedback	cue	on	the	normative	trials.	Subjects	were	therefore	263	
required	to	recall	the	normative	preferences	they	had	learned	during	training.	In	this	264	
session,	all	stimuli	were	colour-coded,	with	a	different	coloured	font	used	for	each	265	
condition,	ensuring	that	subjects	were	able	to	distinguish	between	the	subjective	and	266	
normative	conditions.	This	design	enabled	us	to	examine	activity	in	the	brain	when	subjects	267	
made	identical	decisions,	but	when	these	decisions	were	based	on	subjective	or	normative	268	
valuations.	269	
	270	
	271	
Computational	Modelling	272	
Previous	research	has	shown	that	behaviour	in	delay-discounting	tasks	can	be	modelled	273	
using	a	number	of	different	functions	(Green	et	al.	1994;	Mazur	2001)	that	contain	discount	274	
factors	(free	parameters	that	explain	how	rewards	are	idiosyncratically	discounted	by	time).	275	
Two	models	were	compared	separately	in	terms	of	their	fit	to	the	subjective	preferences	of	276	
the	subjects	and	also	the	subject’s	behaviour	on	the	normative	trials.	The	first	was	a	277	
hyperbolic	model	(Mazur	2001)	in	which	the	subjective	value	of	a	reward	(V)	is	a	function	of	278	
its	magnitude	(M)	and	the	delay	(d)	on	a	given	trial:	279	
	280	
	281	
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(1)																																																														𝑉(#) = 	 '(()()*+,(())	282	
In	this	model	k	is	the	discount	factor,	an	idiosyncratic	free	parameter	that	discounts	the	283	
magnitude	(M)	of	the	reward,	such	that	the	subjective	value	(V)	is	less	than	its	objective	284	
magnitude.	The	value	of	k	therefore	reflects	the	extent	to	which	a	subject	discounts	a	285	
delayed	reward,	such	that	a	high	k	decreases	the	value	of	the	reward	quickly	as	the	delay	286	
becomes	greater.			287	
We	compared	the	hyperbolic	model	with	an	alternative	model,	to	examine	whether	he	288	
hyperbolic	model	best	reflected	choice	behaviour	in	both	the	normative	and	subjective	289	
trials.	In	this	second	model,	the	subjective	value	of	the	rewards	(V)	was	a	function	of	the		290	
exponential	effect	on	the	delay	where:	291	
	292	
(2)	 	 	 	 	 𝑉 = 		 𝑒.+.,(#)		x		𝑀#	293	
	294	
In	(2)	the	discounting	effect	of	the	delay	is	expressed	as	an	exponential	transform	(𝑒)	of	the	295	
discount	factor	(k)	multiplied	by	the	delay	period	(d).	As	such,	the	magnitude	of	a	reward	296	
(M)	is	idiosyncratically,	but	exponentially	discounted	by	the	length	of	delay	before	its	297	
receipt.	The	hyperbolic	and	exponential	models	were	fitted	separately	to	the	preferences	on	298	
the	subjective	trials	and	the	choices	on	the	normative	trials.	Thus,	separate	discount	factors	299	
(k)	could	be	estimated	for	the	subjective	and	normative	trials	and	also	each	model	could	be	300	
compared	in	terms	of	it’s	fit	to	the	data.		301	
As	in	previous	studies	the	models	were	fit	to	the	data	using	the	softmax	algorithm	and	302	
Maximum	Likelihood	Estimation	(Apps	et	al.	2015).	To	fit	the	two	models	to	the	behaviour	of	303	
the	subjects	on	both	the	subjective	and	normative	trials,	the	softmax	algorithm	(Sutton	and	304	
Barto	1998)	was	used.	The	softmax	approach	was	employed	separately	for	estimation	of	the	305	
normative	and	subjective	discount	factors.	This	method	assigns	a	probability	to	the	choices	306	
made	by	the	subjects:	307	
	308	
		(3)	309	
𝑃3	 𝑛 = 		 𝑒(𝛽. 𝑉6) # )𝑒 𝛽. 𝑉6) # + 𝑒(𝛽. 𝑉68 # )	310	
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	311	
This	equation	converts	the	subjective	values	of	the	choices	made	by	the	subjects	(𝑉	6)	)	into	312	
a	probability	(𝑃3	),	as	a	function	of	the	value	of	both	options.	On	trials	where	the	delayed	313	
option	is	chosen	Vo2	is	the	value	of	the	immediate	option	and	equal	to	3	(£3	was	always	the	314	
immediate	option).	On	trials	where	the	immediate	option	is	chosen	Vo2	is	the	value	of	the	315	
delayed	option.	The	coefficient	β	represents	the	stochasticity	(or	temperature)	of	the	316	
behaviour	(i.e.	the	sensitivity	to	the	value	of	each	option).	This	algorithm	therefore	317	
compared	the	value	of	the	chosen	option	to	the	other	options,	the	output	is	the	probability	318	
of	that	option	being	chosen,	given	the	value	of	the	free	parameters	(k	and	β).	The	values	319	
were	taken	from	the	two	models	(see	equation	(1)	and	(2))	outlined	above	and	fitted	320	
separately	to	both	the	subject’s	own	preferences	and	also	the	behaviour	on	the	normative	321	
trials.	This	allowed	for	comparisons	to	be	made	between	the	fit	of	the	exponential	and	322	
hyperbolic	models	for	both	the	subjective	and	normative	behaviours.		323	
Importantly	the	normative	preferences	that	subjects	learnt	during	the	training	session	were	324	
based	on	a	hyperbolic	model	which	was	set	with	a	fixed	discount	factor	(k	=	0.023).	Thus,	it	325	
would	be	expected	that	a	hyperbolic,	rather	than	an	exponential	model	would	better	explain	326	
subjects	behaviour	on	the	normative	trials,	as	we	found.	327	
This	approach	allowed	us	to	examine	the	BOLD	response	that	covaried	with	value	n	each	328	
trial.	Thus,	we	could	examine	activity	that	covaried	with	the	subjective	value	(SV)	of	a	329	
reward	on	subjective	trials	and	with	the	value	of	a	reward	according	to	the	social	norm	on	330	
the	normative	trials	(NV).	331	
	332	
It	is	important	to	note	that	we	did	not	compare	these	models,	in	which	there	were	separate	333	
parameters	for	subjective	and	normative	choices,	with	those	in	which	the	same	parameters	334	
could	account	for	choices	on	both	types	of	trial.	Whilst	such	models	may	have	provided	a	335	
parsimonious	account	of	the	choice	data,	such	an	approach	may	not	be	theoretically	valid	or	336	
allow	us	to	examine	shifts	in	preferences.	The	changes	in	subjective	preferences	from	the	337	
training	session	to	the	scanning	session	reveal	that	(i)	the	source	of	the	valuation	guiding	the	338	
decisions	is	distinct	and	(ii)	subjects	value	rewards	very	differently	prior	to	learning	the	norm	339	
compared	to	how	they	do	after	learning	it.	As	such,	assuming	a	single	discount	function	or	340	
single	temperature	parameter	may	be	parsimonious	for	explaining	the	data,	but,	would	not	341	
allow	us	to	examine	these	changes	in	behaviour.		342	
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Functional	imaging	and	analysis	343	
Data	acquisition	344	
	345	
878	EPI	scans	were	acquired	from	each	participant.	38	slices	(10%	distance	factor)	were	346	
acquired	in	an	ascending	manner,	at	an	oblique	angle	(≈30˚)	to	the	AC-PC	line	to	decrease	347	
the	impact	of	susceptibility	artefact	in	the	subgenual	mPFC	(Deichmann	et	al.	2003).		A	voxel	348	
size	of	3×3×3	mm	(20%	slice	gap,	0.6	mm)	was	used;	TR=3s,	TE=32ms,	flip	angle=85°.	The	349	
functional	sequence	lasted	51	minutes.	T1-weighted	structural	images	were	also	acquired	at	350	
a	resolution	of	1×1×1	mm	using	an	MPRAGE	sequence.	Immediately	following	the	functional	351	
sequence,	phase	and	magnitude	maps	were	collected	using	a	GRE	field	map	sequence	(TE1	=	352	
5.19ms,	TE2	=	7.65ms).	353	
	354	
Image	preprocessing	355	
	356	
Scans	were	pre-processed	using	SPM8	(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).	The	EPI	images	from	357	
each	subject	were	corrected	for	distortions	caused	by	susceptibility-induced	field	358	
inhomogeneities	using	the	FieldMap	toolbox	(Andersson	et	al.	2001).	This	approach	corrects	359	
for	both	static	distortions	and	changes	in	these	distortions	attributable	to	head	motion	360	
(Hutton	et	al.	2002).	The	static	distortions	were	calculated	using	the	phase	and	magnitude	361	
maps	acquired	after	the	EPI	sequence.	The	EPI	images	were	then	realigned,	and	coregistered	362	
to	the	subject’s	own	anatomical	image.	The	structural	image	was	processed	using	a	unified	363	
segmentation	procedure	combining	segmentation,	bias	correction,	and	spatial	normalization	364	
to	the	MNI	template	(Ashburner	and	Friston,	2005);	the	same	normalization	parameters	365	
were	then	used	to	normalize	the	EPI	images.	Lastly,	a	Gaussian	kernel	of	8	mm	FWHM	was	366	
applied	to	spatially	smooth	the	images	in	order	to	conform	to	the	assumptions	of	the	GLM	367	
implemented	in	SPM8.	368	
	369	
Event	definition	and	modelling	370	
	371	
In	this	study,	two	GLM	analyses	were	performed	to	investigate	activity	that	varied	372	
parametrically	with	the	subjective	(SV)	and	normative	values	(NV)	of	temporally	discounted	373	
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rewards.	The	first	GLM	was	employed	to	examine	activity	that	varied	with	the	normatively	374	
and	subjectively	discounted	values.	In	the	second	GLM	an	analysis	was	performed	to	375	
examine	whether	activity	on	subjective	and	normative	trials	might	be	better	explained	by	376	
“offline”	vs	“online”	valuations	as	in	Nicolle	et	al.,	(2012)	–	see	supplementary	materials.	377	
	378	
	Each	GLM	design	matrix	contained	regressors	modelling:	379	
• Trial-type	cue	(informing	the	subject	whether	they	should	indicate	their	own	380	
preference	or	the	normative	preference	on	the	trial)		381	
• Subject	offer	cue	(the	delayed	reward	option	on	the	trials	where	the	subjects	382	
indicated	their	own	preferences)	383	
• Norm	offer	cue	(cuing	the	subject	to	indicate	the	normative	preference)	384	
• Subject	trigger	cue	(the	trigger	cue	when	the	subject	indicated	their	own	385	
preference)	386	
• Norm	trigger	cue	(cuing	the	subject	to	indicate	the	normative	preference)	387	
• Missed	trials	(a	regressor	modelling	the	onsets	of	the	trial-type	cue,	option	and	388	
trigger	cues	of	missed	trials)	389	
	390	
Regressors	were	constructed	for	each	of	these	events	by	convolving	the	event	timings	with	391	
the	canonical	Haemodynamic	Response	Function	(HRF).	The	residual	effects	of	head	motion	392	
were	modelled	in	the	analysis	by	including	the	six	parameters	of	head	motion	acquired	393	
during	preprocessing	as	covariates	of	no	interest.	We	ran	two	GLMs	at	the	single-subject	394	
level	that	each	contained	different	additional	parameters.	In	addition	to	the	regressors	395	
defined	for	the	event	types	outlined	above,	each	GLM	also	contained	regressors	which	were	396	
first	order	parametric	modulations	of	the	offer	cue	and	trigger	cue	events.	These	modulators	397	
scaled	the	amplitude	of	the	HRF	in	line	with	either	the	SV	and	NV	on	the	subjective	or	398	
normative	trials	respectively.	The	values	from	SV	and	NV	were	taken	from	the	hyperbolic	399	
model	as	outlined	above.	Thus,	we	were	able	to	examine	whether	the	BOLD	signal	covaried	400	
with	SV	and	NV	at	the	time	the	options	were	presented	and	at	the	time	when	subjects	401	
indicated	their	choices.		402	
	403	
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The	second	GLM	had	the	same	structure	except	that	different	parametric	modulators	were	404	
used.	Specifically,	we	used	the	offline	SV	as	a	parametric	modulator	on	the	normative	option	405	
and	trigger	cues,	and	the	offline	NV	was	used	as	a	parametric	modulator	of	the	subjective	406	
option	and	trigger	cues.	This	allowed	us	to	examine	whether	different	regions	of	the	mPFC	407	
showed	the	same	‘online/offline’	profile	as	suggested	by	Nicolle	et	al.,	(2012).		 	408	
Group	analysis,	Contrasts	and	Thresholding	409	
	410	
Random	effects	analyses	were	applied	to	determine	voxels	significantly	different	at	the	411	
group	level.	SPM{t}	images	from	all	subjects	at	the	first-level	were	input	into	second-level	412	
Flexible	Factorial	design	matrices.	T	and	F-contrasts	were	conducted	on	the	regressors	to	413	
examine	differences	between	SV	and	NV	and	the	effects	of	SV	and	NV	independently.	These	414	
contrasts	identified	voxels	in	which	activity	varied	parametrically	in	the	manner	predicted	by	415	
the	subjective	or	normative	value	parameters.	The	main	analysis	is	reported	from	activity	416	
time-locked	to	the	offer	cues.	An	additional	analysis	from	the	trigger	cues	was	also	417	
conducted	(supplementary	table.1).	To	examine	the	effects	of	shifts	in	subjects’	preferences	418	
in	subjective	value	from	before	and	after	learning	the	social	norm,	covariates	were	entered	419	
on	t-tests	for	SV	and	NV	in	second-level	design	matrices.		420	
To	 correct	 for	 multiple	 comparisons	 we	 first	 identified	 a	 large	 cluster	 by	 using	 a	 cluster-	421	
threshold	as	recommended	by	Woo	et	al.	2014	to	identify	an	initial,	 large	mPFC	cluster.	To	422	
then	be	more	anatomically	specific	we	used	masks	of	putatively	areas	8,	9,	11,	32	and	pre-423	
SMA	 from	 Neubert	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 as	 small	 volume	 corrections.	 In	 addition,	 we	 used	 these	424	
same	masks	in	a	region	of	interest	(ROI)	analysis.	The	masks	of	Neubert	et	al.,	(2015)	were	425	
created	 based	 on	 resting-state	 and	 diffusion-weighted	 imaging	 in	 both	 humans	 and	426	
macaques,	 and	 highlight	 the	 largely	 preserved	 connectional	 properties	 of	 these	 regions	427	
across	species.	These	masks	therefore	provide	a	detailed	anatomically	derived	parcellation	428	
of	the	mPFC	that	we	can	use	to	delineate	the	contributions	of	different	regions	of	the	mPFC	429	
to	 value	 processing	 in	 this	 study.	Note	 that	 by	 using	 this	 approach	we	 could	 examine	 the	430	
effects	of	SV	and	NV	in	different	regions	of	the	mPFC	in	a	manner	that	would	not	be	possible	431	
using	the	traditional	approach	of	contrasting	SV	with	NV	and	examining	the	peak	response	432	
or	averaging	over	the	effects	across	the	whole	cluster.		433	
	434	
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In	addition	to	the	small	volume	correction	approach,	we	also	performed	a	ROI	analysis	using	435	
MARSBAR.	In	this	approach,	we	averaged	over	the	effects	of	all	of	the	voxels	in	each	mask.	436	
This	analysis	is	reported	in	full	in	Supp.	Fig.2.		437	
	 	438	
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Results	439	
We	 designed	 a	 novel	 version	 of	 an	 inter-temporal	 decision-making	 task	 to	 investigate	440	
activity	 covarying	with	 subjective	 or	 normative	 valuations	 of	 rewards	 (fig.1).	 During	 fMRI,	441	
subjects	made	 choices	 between	 a	 low	 (£3),	 immediately	 received	 reward,	 and	 a	 larger	 in	442	
magnitude	 (£3.10	 -	 £20)	 but	 delayed	 (1	 –	 180	 days)	 reward.	On	half	 of	 the	 trials	 subjects	443	
were	instructed	to	indicate	their	own	preference,	but	crucially,	on	the	other	half	of	the	trials,	444	
subjects	 were	 required	 to	 indicate	 the	 preference.	 The	 normative	 preferences	 had	 been	445	
learnt	 through	 trial	 and	 error	 during	 a	 training	 session	 (See	Methods	 &	 Supp.	 material).	446	
Thus	 on	 half	 the	 trials	 subjects	 choices	 were	 made	 based	 on	 a	 subjective	 valuation	 of	 a	447	
delayed	reward,	but	on	the	other	half	of	the	trials	the	same	kind	of	valuation	was	dictated	448	
by	a	social	norm.	449	
	450	
	451	
Behavioural	Results	452	
Rewards	are	hyperbolically	discounted	by	delays	453	
Are	 rewards	devalued	by	 temporal	delays?	Consistent	with	a	 large	body	of	previous	work,	454	
rewards	were	 subjectively	 devalued	 by	 the	 temporal	 delay	 before	 receipt	 (fig.2a,b;	 Supp.	455	
Results).	 Crucially,	 however,	 there	 was	 no	 difference	 between	 subjects’	 choices	 on	 the	456	
subjective	 and	 normative	 trials	 at	 the	 group	 level	 during	 scanning	 (p	 >	 0.1).	 This	 result	457	
importantly	 ensures	 that	 activity	 identified	 in	 neural	 analyses	 is	 not	 driven	 by	 systematic	458	
differences	 in	 valuation	 of	 delayed	 rewards	 by	 subjects	 in	 the	 normative	 and	 subjective	459	
conditions	(see	Supp.	results).		460	
To	 characterise	 the	nature	of	 the	discounting	effect,	we	 fitted	hyperbolic	 and	exponential	461	
‘discount’	models	separately	to	the	choices	on	the	normative	and	subjective	trials,	using	the	462	
softmax	 algorithm	 and	 maximum	 likelihood	 estimation	 (see	Methods,	 (fig.2c)	 and	 Supp.	463	
Table	 2.).	 Thus,	 for	 each	model	 we	 estimated	 a	 “discount	 factor	 (‘k’)”	 which	 dictates	 the	464	
extent	 to	which	 a	 reward	 is	 devalued	by	 a	 delay	 and	 a	 stochasticity	 parameter	 (β),	which	465	
represents	 how	 noisy	 valuations	 are.	 	 To	 determine	 which	 function	 best	 fitted	 the	466	
behavioural	 data,	 (fig.2c)	 we	 conducted	 a	 2x2	 repeated	 measures	 ANOVA	 on	 the	 log-467	
likelihood	for	each	condition	(subjective,	normative)	and	function	(exponential,	hyperbolic).	468	
We	 found	 a	 marginal	 effect	 of	 condition	 and	 a	 main	 effect	 of	 function,	 and	 a	 marginal	469	
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interaction	 (Condition	 (F(1,14)	 =	 	 4.391,	 p	 =	 0.055);	 Function	 (F(1,14)	 =	 17.554,	 P<0.001);	470	
Condition	x	Function	(F(1,14)	=	3.874,	p	=	0.07).	Examination	of	the	log-likelihood	estimates	471	
shows	 that	 the	 effect	 was	 driven	 by	 a	 better	 fit	 of	 the	 hyperbolic	 model	 to	 both	 the	472	
subjective	and	normative	choice	data,	in	line	with	previous	studies	examining	inter-temporal	473	
choice	 data	 (Mazur	 2001).	 Further	 analyses	 were	 therefore	 completed	 using	 only	 the	474	
hyperbolic	model.	 	475	
	476	
Social	norms	are	accurately	reproduced	477	
For	 the	 aims	 of	 this	 study	 it	 was	 important	 that	 subjects	 were	 able	 to	 reproduce	 the	478	
normative	 preferences	 that	 they	 had	 learnt	 during	 the	 training	 session	 accurately	 on	 the	479	
normative	 trials	 inside	 the	 scanner.	 To	examine	 this	we	 compared	 the	estimated	discount	480	
factor	from	the	hyperbolic	model	on	the	normative	trials	during	scanning	with	the	discount	481	
factor	which	was	used	to	create	the	normative	behaviour	that	subjects	 learnt	through	trial	482	
and	 error	 during	 training	 (k	 =	 0.023).	 We	 found	 no	 significant	 difference	 between	 these	483	
discount	factors	(t(14)	=	0.36,	p	>	0.7),	highlighting	that	subjects’	choices	on	the	normative	484	
trials	were	not	significantly	different	from	the	behaviour	that	they	had	learnt	as	normative	485	
during	training.	(fig.2d)		486	
Were	subjects	making	the	same	choices	on	both	the	normative	and	subjective	trials?	There	487	
was	no	significant	difference	between	the	discount	factors	in	the	normative	and	subjective	488	
conditions	(U(14)	=	0.47,	p	>	0.6).	However,	this	absence	of	a	difference	can	most	likely	be	489	
attributed	 to	 the	high	 levels	of	 variability	across	 subjects	 in	 the	 subjective	valuation	 trials.	490	
Importantly,	there	was	also	no	correlation	between	the	subjective	discount	parameters	and	491	
the	 normative	 discount	 parameters	 across	 subjects	 (rs	=	0.23,	p	 	 =	 0.4).	 This	 indicates	 that	492	
whilst	at	the	group	level	there	was	no	difference	in	behaviour	in	the	two	conditions,	subjects	493	
were	not	 simply	performing	 the	normative	 trials	using	 the	same	discount	 function	as	 they	494	
were	on	the	subjective	trials.	Thus,	they	were	behaving	differently	in	the	two	conditions,	and	495	
performing	 the	 normative	 trials	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 normative	 discount	 function	 they	496	
had	learned.		497	
	498	
	499	
	500	
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Shifts	in	subjective	preferences	after	learning	norms	501	
Seventy-three	 percent	 of	 subjects	 shifted	 their	 preferences	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 norm	502	
between	 the	 subjective	 preferences	 task	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 training	 session	 and	 the	503	
subjective	trials	inside	the	scanner	after	they	had	learnt	the	norm	(fig.2).	A	Mann-Whitney	U	504	
test	on	the	difference	of	subjective	discount	factors	from	the	norm	discount	factors	prior	to	505	
learning	the	norm,	compared	to	the	difference	between	the	parameters	after	 learning	the	506	
norm	discount	factor,	showed	a	significant	effect	(U(14)	=	-1.7,	p	<	0.042,	one-tailed).	Overall	507	
subjects	were	significantly	closer	to	the	norm	in	the	scanning	session,	after	they	had	learnt	508	
the	 norm,	 than	 they	were	 during	 the	 training	 session	 before	 being	 exposed	 to	 the	 norm.	509	
However,	 there	 was	 a	 correlation	 between	 a	 subjects	 discounting	 parameter	 prior	 to	510	
learning	 the	norm	and	post	 learning	 the	norm,	 suggesting	 that	whilst	 there	was	 a	 shift	 in	511	
behaviour	 overall,	 subjects	 remained	 relatively	 impatient	 or	 patient	 with	 respect	 to	 the	512	
other	 subjects	 after	 learning	 the	normative	preferences	 (Rs	 =	0.8,	p	 <	 0.001).	 Thus,	 in	 line	513	
with	research	showing	that	minimal	group	exposure	can	have	powerful	effects	on	behaviour	514	
(Hewstone	et	al.	2002),	our	results	suggest	that	subjects	shifted	their	subjective	preferences	515	
towards	the	norm	following	the	learning	of	normative	preferences,	rather	than	shifting	their	516	
performance	on	the	normative	trials	towards	their	original	subjective	preferences.	However,	517	
we	note	 that	given	 the	 sample	 size	 that	 inferences	made	upon	all	 analyses	 related	 to	 this	518	
shift	in	preferences	should	be	made	with	caution.	519	
	520	
	521	
fMRI	results	522	
In	 this	 study	we	were	 interested	 in	 examining	 activity	 time-locked	 to	 the	 offer	 cue	when	523	
subjects	 evaluated	either	 the	 subjective	 value	 (SV)	 or	 normative	 value	 (NV)	of	 an	offered,	524	
delayed,	reward	(analysis	of	the	response	cues	are	included	in	the	supplementary	material).	525	
To	 examine	 the	 processing	 of	 SV	 and	 NV	 we	 used	 the	 values	 taken	 from	 the	 hyperbolic	526	
model	fitted	to	the	subjects	behaviour,	and	used	them	as	parametric	modulators	of	activity	527	
at	the	time	of	the	offer	cue	on	the	corresponding	trials	(see	supp.	Table	1	 for	results	from	528	
the	 response	 cue).	 That	 is,	 we	 examined	 activity	 that	 parametrically	 varied	 with	 NV	 on	529	
normative	trials	and	activity	that	parametrically	varied	with	SV	on	subjective	trials.		530	
	531	
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Main	Analyses	532	
The	mPFC	differentially	codes	subjective	and	normative	value	533	
The	first	hypothesis	was	that	sub-regions	across	the	DmPFC	and	VmPFC	might	signal	value	534	
differently	on	subjective	and	normative	trials.	To	examine	this	question	we	first	performed	a	535	
whole-brain	corrected	comparison	between	SV	and	NV.	An	F-contrast	between	the	SV	and	536	
NV	 parametric	 modulators	 revealed	 a	 large	 cluster	 extending	 over	 both	 the	 dorsal	 and	537	
ventral	portions	of	the	mPFC	(3095	voxels)	that	was	significant	at	a	cluster-wise	threshold	(Z	538	
=	 4.09,	 P	 <	 0.001	 uncorrected	 voxel-wise	 threshold,	 P	 <	 0.05	 FWE	 cluster	 threshold	 (as	539	
recommended	 by	 Woo	 et	 al.	 2014)).	 Although	 other	 regions	 also	 showed	 a	 significant	540	
difference	between	SV	and	NV	(See	Supp.	Results),	 for	the	aims	of	this	paper	we	focus	on	541	
the	mPFC	cluster.	However,	we	note	 that	we	also	 found	a	similar	pattern	of	 results	 in	 the	542	
posterior	 superior	 temporal	 sulcus	 to	 those	 we	 report	 in	 the	 mPFC,	 and	 at	 a	 reduced	543	
threshold	we	found	a	cluster	in	the	ventral	striatum	that	coded	SV	only	(Supp.	Figs.	3	and	5)		544	
In	line	with	our	hypotheses,	the	mPFC	cluster	contained	multiple	peaks	which	corresponded	545	
putatively	with	divisions	of	the	mPFC	based	on	cytoarchitectonic	and	connectional	anatomy	546	
Neubert	et	al	.,(2015).	In	line	with	our	predictions	peaks	were	identified	in	areas	BA	8,	9,	11	547	
and	 32.	 (see	 Supp.fig.2	 for	 masks	 of	 these	 regions).	 In	 the	 following	 sections	 we	548	
demonstrate	 that	each	of	 these	5	 zones	did	 in	 fact	 signal	SV	and	NV	differently,	however,	549	
they	clustered	into	three	sub-regions	that	each	had	a	distinct	signature	for	signalling	SV	and	550	
NV.	 For	 each	 region	 we	 highlight	 a	 small	 volume	 corrected	 result	 to	 demonstrate	 the	551	
difference	 in	 signalling	 of	 SV	 and	 NV	 in	 each	 region	 before	 then	 highlighting	 the	 specific	552	
nature	of	value	signalling	in	each	region.	553	
	554	
Coding	of	normative,	but	not	subjective,	value	in	the	anterior	DmPFC	555	
To	examine	effects	in	the	anterior	DmPFC	we	used	masks	corresponding	to	BA	8	and	9,	both	556	
regions	 which	 have	 been	 identified	 in	 studies	 examining	 the	 neural	 basis	 of	 social	 norm	557	
processing	(Izuma	2013).	Details	of	the	extent	of	these	masks	are	shown	in	supplementary	558	
material	(see	Supp.Fig.2).	We	identified	a	peak	within	the	spatial	extent	of	each	mask	for	the	559	
contrast	between	SV	and	NV	 (Area	8	mask:	 x	=	 -4,	 y	=	32,	 z	=	52;	Z	=	3.88,	p	<	0.05	small	560	
volume	correction	(SVC);	Area	9:	x	=	6,	y	=	52,	z	=	38;	Z	=	3.80	SVC)	demonstrating	that	both	561	
sub-regions	differentially	signaled	NV	and	SV.	Examination	of	the	response	in	the	peak	voxel	562	
in	 each	 region	 (fig.3)	 suggested	 that	 activity	 in	 both	 areas	 covaried	 only	 with	 NV	 on	563	
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normative	trials	and	not	with	SV	on	the	subjective	trials.	Statistically,	this	was	demonstrated	564	
by	clusters	in	the	same	regions,	with	the	same	peak	voxels,	showing	an	effect	of	NV	(Area	8:	565	
x	=	-4,	y	=	32,	z	=	52;	Z	=	3.8,	p	<	0.05	SVC);	Area	9:	x	=	6,	y	=	52,	z	=	38;	Z	=	3.69	svc)	but	no	566	
voxels	in	these	regions	showing	any	effect	of	SV	even	at	a	considerably	reduced	threshold	(p	567	
<	0.05	uncorrected).	Thus,	anterior	DmPFC	sub-regions	were	specifically	sensitive	to	NV	on	568	
normative	trials,	but	not	SV	on	subjective	trials.	That	is	the	region	was	sensitive	to	value	but	569	
only	in	the	normative	condition.	570	
	571	
Opposing	coding	of	subjective	and	normative	value	in	the	VmPFC	572	
We	applied	the	same	approach	to	examine	activity	 in	 the	VmPFC,	using	masks	of	areas	11	573	
and	 32	 (See	 Supp.Fig.2	 for	 spatial	 extent).	 Both	 of	 these	 regions	 have	 been	 identified	 as	574	
signalling	 subjective	 value	 (Kable	 and	 Glimcher	 2007;	 Neubert	 et	 al.	 2015)	 in	 human	575	
neuroimaging	tasks.		576	
	577	
Similar	 to	 the	DmPFC,	clusters	 in	both	regions	showed	a	significant	difference	between	SV	578	
and	NV	(Area	32	mask:	x	=	6,	y	=	46,	z	=	10;	Z	=	3.56,	p	<	0.05	svc;	Area	11:	x	=	-8,	y	=	42,	z	=-579	
10;	Z	=	3.58,	p	<	0.05	svc).	Activity	in	these	regions	showed	an	effect	of	both	SV	and	NV,	but	580	
in	 the	opposite	 direction	 (fig.3).	 This	was	demonstrated	 statistically	 by	 clusters	within	 the	581	
spatial	extent	of	both	masks	-	each	containing	the	peak	voxel	from	the	contrast	between	SV	582	
and	NV	-	showing	a	positive	effect	of	SV	and	a	negative	effect	of	NV	alone,	albeit	at	a	slightly	583	
reduced	 threshold	 (p	 <	 0.002	 uncorrected).	 Activity	 in	 these	 regions	 showed	 an	 effect	 of	584	
both	SV	and	NV,	but	in	the	opposite	direction	(fig.3).	This	was	demonstrated	statistically	by	585	
clusters	within	 the	spatial	extent	of	both	masks	 -	each	containing	 the	peak	voxel	 from	the	586	
contrast	between	SV	and	NV	 -	 showing	a	positive	effect	of	SV	and	a	negative	effect	of	NV	587	
alone,	albeit	at	a	slightly	reduced	threshold	(p	<	0.002	uncorrected).	This	suggests	that	both	588	
sub-regions	of	 the	VmPFC	showed	a	significant	effect	of	value,	but	activity	covaried	 in	 the	589	
opposite	direction	for	SV	and	NV	in	both	regions.	Our	claim	is	supported	by	the	ROI	analyses	590	
in	 which	 both	 clusters	 had	 significant	 effects	 of	 SV	 and	 NV	 when	 correcting	 for	 multiple	591	
comparisons	(See	Methods,	Supp.	Results	and	Supp.	Fig.2).	Although	the	effects	for	SV	in	the	592	
VmPFC	were	slightly	weaker	than	our	other	reported	results,	there	is	considerable	evidence	593	
that	 the	 VmPFC	 does	 signal	 such	 information,	 particularly	 in	 temporal	 discounting	 tasks	594	
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(Kable	&	Glimcher,	2007)	and	in	this	study	the	reduced	significance	may	have	been	driven	by	595	
the	variability	in	this	region	for	signalling	SV	(see	below).	596	
	597	
	598	
Subjective	and	Normative	value	in	the	posterior	DmPFC	599	
To	examine	whether	any	regions	processed	the	value	of	rewards	regardless	of	whether	the	600	
valuation	was	normative	or	subjective	we	performed	a	conjunction	between	SV	and	NV.	This	601	
contrast	revealed	voxels	in	in	a	more	posterior	region	of	the	DmPFC	(p	<	0.001	uncorrected	602	
voxel-wise	 threshold,	 P	 <	 0.05	 FWE	 cluster	 corrected).	 This	 region	 lying	 anterior	 to	 the	603	
border	between	 the	precentral	gyrus	and	 the	superior	 frontal	gyrus	on	 the	medial	 surface	604	
fell	within	the	region	often	referred	to	as	the	pre-supplementary	motor	area	(Pre-SMA;	(x	=	-605	
8,	 y	 =	 20,	 z	 =	 44;	 Z	 =	 4.96,	 p	 <	 0.05	 SVC).	 A	 cluster	 and	 also	 the	 peak	 voxel	 from	 the	606	
conjunction	was	also	identified	independently	as	showing	a	significant	effect	of	both	SV	and	607	
NV	 in	 the	 same	 direction	 (p	<	 0.001	 uncorrected).	 Activity	 in	 the	 posterior	 regions	 of	 the	608	
DmPFC	therefore	covaried	both	with	SV	on	subjective	trials	and	NV	on	the	normative	trials	in	609	
the	same	manner.		610	
Shifts	in	subjective	valuations	and	conformity	to	social	norms	611	
Behaviourally	we	found	a	shift	of	subjects’	valuations	towards	the	normative	valuations	on	612	
the	subjective	trials	after	learning	the	normative	preferences.	Previous	studies	have	shown	613	
that	 regions	 of	 the	DmPFC	 and	VmPFC	 are	 engaged	when	updating	 behaviour	 in	 order	 to	614	
conform	 to	 social	 norms	 (Klucharev	et	 al.	 2009;	Garvert	 et	 al.	 2015).	 To	examine	whether	615	
this	effect	was	related	to	the	processing	of	SV	and	NV	in	the	mPFC,	we	used	the	difference	in	616	
discount	factors	between	subjective	discount	factor	during	the	first	part	of	training	to	that	617	
during	scanning	as	a	covariate.	We	then	examined	whether	the	extent	to	which	activity	that	618	
varied	 with	 SV	 on	 subjective	 trials	 or	 NV	 on	 normative	 trials	 covaried	 with	 the	 extent	 to	619	
which	subjects	shifted	their	choices.	We	found	3	separate	clusters	in	the	mPFC	that	survived	620	
correction	 for	 multiple	 comparisons	 using	 the	 masks	 of	 area	 32	 (14,48,	 4,	 Z	 =	 3.69,	 p	 <	621	
0.05svc),	8	 (-12,	32,	50,	Z	=	4.11,	p	<	0.05svc)	and	9	 	 (-10,	48,	42	Z	=	3.64,	p	<	0.05svc)	 in	622	
which	 activity	was	 correlated	with	 SV	 on	 subjective	 trials	 (see	 supp.fig.4).	 Clusters	 in	 the	623	
same	regions	also	showed	a	significant	correlation	between	the	degree	of	SV	coding	and	the	624	
extent	 to	which	 subjects	 got	 closer	 to	 the	norm	 from	 the	 first	 to	 the	 second	 session,	 at	 a	625	
reduced	 threshold	 (p<0.005	uncorrected.	We	 found	no	clusters	 in	which	activity	 covarying	626	
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with	NV	correlated	with	shifts	in	subjective	valuations.	).	These	findings	are	consistent	with	627	
the	notion	that	activity	in	these	regions	is	related	to	shifts	in	behaviour	based	on	learning	a	628	
norm.	However,	we	note	that	given	the	sample	size	that	inferences	made	upon	all	analyses	629	
related	to	this	shift	in	preferences	should	be	made	with	caution.	630	
	631	
	632	
Supplementary	and	Control	Analyses	633	
Memory	demands	634	
To	examine	whether	our	effects	could	be	driven	simply	by	memory	demands	on	the	635	
normative	trials	compared	to	the	subjective	trials,	we	performed	a	contrast	between	activity	636	
at	the	time	of	the	offer	cues	on	the	normative	trials	to	those	on	the	subjective	trials.	We	637	
found	no	voxels	in	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex	showing	a	significant	effect	(p<0.05FWE-svc	638	
corrected	for	each	ROI).	This	would	therefore	argue	against	the	notion	that	activity	may	be	639	
related	to	simply	recalling	what	decision	to	make	against	choosing	one	based	on	one’s	own	640	
valuation.	641	
	642	
Value	not	Conflict	643	
Could	activity	on	either	trial-type	be	related	to	‘conflict’	between	the	choice	options?	To	644	
examine	this	we	performed	two	additional	analyses.	We	created	a	parametric	regressor	of	645	
the	difference	between	the	subjective	and	normative	valuation	on	each	trial.	In	these	646	
regressors	covarying	activity	would	be	dependent	on	the	degree	of	conflict	between	the	two	647	
valuations.	We	then	examined	in	the	ROIs	used	in	the	main	analyses	whether	activity	648	
covaried	with	these	regressors	on	the	subjective	or	normative	trials.	We	found	that	none	of	649	
the	ROIs	showed	a	significant	effect	of	these	“conflict	regressors”	even	at	a	reduced	650	
threshold	(P<0.01	uncorrected)	on	either	type	of	trial.	Secondly,	we	then	examined	whether	651	
activity	in	these	regions	signalled	“decision	conflict/difficulty”,	regardless	of	trial	type.	This	652	
decision	difficulty	regressor	was	the	absolute	value	on	each	trial	type	subtracted	from	the	653	
value	of	the	immediate	offer	(£3).	This	examined	activity	that	would	be	highest	when	the	654	
value	of	the	immediate	and	delayed	option	was	closest	to	each	other	and	thus	choosing	655	
between	them	would	be	most	difficult.	None	of	the	ROIs	in	the	mPFC	showed	activity	that	656	
significantly	covaried	with	this	this	decision	difficulty/conflict	regressor,	even	at	a	reduced	657	
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threshold	(p<0.01	uncorrected).	There	is	therefore	little	evidence	of	any	conflict	related	658	
signals	in	the	regions	we	examined.	 	659	
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Discussion	660	
In	many	social	situations	our	subjective	valuations	of	economic	rewards	are	overridden	by	661	
our	desire	to	conform	to	social	norms.	In	this	study,	we	examined	how	the	brain	processes	662	
the	value	of	rewards	according	to	a	social	norm	and	whether	such	valuations	are	coded	663	
similarly	to	subjective	value	in	the	mPFC.	Subjects	performed	inter-temporal	choices	that	664	
were	either	based	on	their	own	subjective	preferences	or	on	a	learnt	social	norm.	We	found	665	
that	a	large	portion	of	the	mPFC	was	sensitive	to	reward	valuations	and	showed	a	difference	666	
between	the	processing	of	subjective	and	normative	valuations.	Across	this	region,	three	667	
distinct	sub-regions	were	identified	that	processed	the	value	of	rewards	differently	if	the	668	
valuation	was	driven	by	subjective	or	normative	information.	In	support	of	previous	research	669	
examining	the	processing	of	social	norms,	our	results	implicated	the	anterior	portions	of	the	670	
DmPFC	(areas	8	and	9).	However,	we	show	that	this	region	covaried	exclusively	with	value	671	
on	the	normative	trials,	and	not	on	the	subjective	trials.	However,	activity	in	posterior	672	
regions	of	the	DmPFC	covaried	with	value	on	both	subjective	and	normative	trials	and	673	
activity	in	the	VmPFC	varied	with	subjective	value	positively	but	normative	values	negatively.	674	
In	addition,	we	found	that	the	extent	to	which	parts	of	the	anterior	DmPFC,	and	area32	of	675	
the	VmPFC,	signal	SV	is	correlated	with	shifts	in	subjective	preferences.	Specifically	how	676	
much	individuals	have	shifted	their	subjective	valuations	after	being	exposed	to	a	norm	677	
correlates	with	the	degree	to	which	these	regions	signal	SV.	These	results	highlight	that	678	
normative	valuations	are	coded	distinctly	from	subjective	valuations	in	the	mPFC.	679	
Research	examining	the	neural	basis	of	social	norm	processing,	social	influence	and	680	
conformity	has	consistently	implicated	the	DmPFC	(Izuma	2013).	Neuroimaging	studies	have	681	
shown	that	activity	across	the	Pre-SMA,	BA	8	and	BA	9	tracks	how	different	one’s	opinions	682	
are	from	those	of	another	group	or	individual,	and	these	regions	are	engaged	when	683	
updating	one’s	own,	or	when	learning	another	group	or	persons	opinions	(Berns	et	al.	2005;	684	
Klucharev	et	al.	2009;	Campbell-Meiklejohn	et	al.	2010;	Zaki	et	al.	2011;	Nicolle	et	al.	2012;	685	
Izuma	and	Adolphs	2013;	Garvert	et	al.	2015;	Nook	and	Zaki	2015).	Moreover,	Transcranial	686	
Magnetic	Stimulation	(TMS)	studies	have	shown	that	information	processing	in	the	DmPFC	is	687	
causally	linked	to	social	norm	guided	behaviours	and	conformity	(Klucharev	et	al.	2011;	688	
Izuma	et	al.	2015).	As	a	result,	it	is	often	argued	that	the	DmPFC	processes	information	that	689	
guides	behaviours	when	operating	in	social	groups	and	when	under	social	influence.	690	
Alternatively,	some	have	argued	that	the	mPFC	plays	an	important	role	in	signalling	decision-691	
difficulty	or	conflict	monitoring	(Botvinick	et	al.	2004).	However,	we	found	little	evidence	of	692	
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such	signals	in	this	experiment.	This	may	be	down	to	the	fact	that	the	region	which	has	often	693	
been	debated	as	signalling	conflict,	lies	in	the	ACC	in	areas	24	or	32,	and	not	in	areas	8	and	9.	694	
Our	results	are	therefore	much	more	consistent	with	the	DmPFC	signalling	social	695	
information	that	guides	behaviour	when	interacting	in	social	groups.	We	show	that	such	696	
social	specificity	is	only	present	in	the	anterior	portions	of	the	DmPFC	(areas	8	and	9).	In	697	
addition,	we	show	that	specificity	for	processing	NV	in	the	DmPFC	may	depend	on	the	extent	698	
to	which	people’s	subjective	preferences	are	influenced	by	normative	information.	That	is,	699	
the	extent	to	which	activity	in	sub-regions	of	the	DmPFC	(area	9)	varied	with	SV	was	700	
dependent	on	how	much	an	individual’s	subjective	preferences	were	influenced	by	the	701	
learning	of	normative	information.	This	suggests	that	the	extent	to	which	people	are	702	
influenced	by	social	information	might	influence	how	the	DmPFC	codes	our	own	valuations.	703	
This	is	in	line	with	evidence	that	the	DmPFC	may	be	a	key	region	for	learning	about	the	social	704	
norms	(Izuma	2013;	Izuma	et	al.	2015)	and	also	by	how	influenced	people	are	by	the	705	
behaviour	of	another	individual	(Garvert	et	al.	2015)	706	
However,	our	results	suggest	that	these	properties	are	not	shared	across	all	of	the	DmPFC.	707	
Specifically,	we	found	that	a	more	posterior	portion	of	the	DmPFC	(putatively	in	the	pre-708	
SMA),	signalled	value	on	both	subjective	and	normative	trials.	This	would	support	accounts	709	
that	suggest	this	region	is	important	for	the	processing	the	value	of	choices,	but	does	not	710	
play	any	specific	role	in	social	or	non-social	behaviours	(Nachev	et	al.,	2008).	Specifically,	711	
there	is	evidence	that	neurons	that	direct	actions	towards	rewards	are	present	in	this	region	712	
and	also	that	this	region	is	important	for	initiating	behaviours	(Wang	et	al.	2001;	Nachev	et	713	
al.	2008).	Supporting	this	claim,	anatomical	evidence	shows	that	the	pre-SMA	is	strongly	714	
connected	to	parts	of	the	motor	system,	with	connections	of	the	premotor	cortex	and	parts	715	
of	the	basal-ganglia	that	are	putatively	important	for	valuing	and	selecting	actions	(Nachev	716	
et	al.	2008).	Our	results	support	the	notion	that	the	pre-SMA	is	sensitive	to	value.	However,	717	
we	show	the	importance	of	accurate	localisation	for	understanding	DmPFC	function.	Using	718	
the	approach	implemented	here	and	localising	activity	to	specific	regions	that	are	known	to	719	
have	distinct	functions,	connections	and	anatomical	properties,	we	were	able	to	show	that	720	
the	Pre-SMA	may	signal	value	regardless	of	the	source	of	the	valuation	with	greater	721	
precision.		722	
A	wealth	of	research	has	suggested	that	the	VmPFC	processes	information	that	is	consistent	723	
with	a	role	in	value-guided	choice	(Kable	and	Glimcher	2007;	Rushworth	and	Behrens	2008;	724	
O’Doherty	2014;	Strait	et	al.	2014;	Manohar	and	Husain	2016).	Such	a	notion	is	supported	by	725	
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its	anatomical	connections	to	other	regions	of	the	brain	that	process	the	subjective	value	of	726	
rewards	including	portions	of	the	intraparietal	sulcus,	amygdala	nuclei,	both	medial	and	727	
lateral	portions	of	the	orbitofrontal	cortex,	and	the	ventral	striatum	(Haber	et	al.	2006;	728	
Kable	and	Glimcher	2007,	2010;	Petrides	and	Pandya	2007;	Kim	et	al.	2008;	Hunt	et	al.	2012;	729	
Neubert	et	al.	2015).	In	addition	a	plethora	of	neuroimaging	studies	highlight	that	activity	in	730	
this	region	scales	with	the	subjective	value	of	a	chosen	reward	(O’Doherty	2014).	These	731	
findings	have	led	many	to	suggest	that	this	region	plays	a	crucial	role	in	integrating	732	
information	about	the	value	of	rewards	in	order	to	select	behaviours	that	have	the	highest	733	
value.	Our	results	do	not	support	this	account.	Instead,	activity	in	both	areas	11	and	32	in	734	
the	VmPFC	scaled	positively	with	SV	but	crucially	scaled	negatively	with	the	NV	of	rewards.	735	
This	suggests	that	this	region	is	sensitive	to	the	value	of	rewards,	but	its	processing	of	value	736	
is	context-dependent	and	the	nature	of	the	value-computations	performed	in	this	region	737	
may	differ	depending	on	whether	a	reward	valuation	is	a	function	of	social	information	or	is	738	
subjective.			739	
There	is	in	fact	a	plethora	of	evidence	supporting	the	notion	that	the	VmPFC	processes	740	
information	that	influences	social	behaviour	is	supported	by	anatomical	and	functional	741	
evidence.	Medial	portions	of	areas	11	and	32	in	the	VmPFC	have	connections	to	portions	of	742	
the	amygdala,	dysgranular	portions	of	the	anterior	insula,	posterior	portions	of	the	superior	743	
temporal	sulcus,	the	anterior	cingulate	gyrus,	and	regions	in	the	DmPFC	that	we	found	to	744	
process	only	normative	value	(Morecraft	et	al.	1992;	Petrides	and	Pandya	2007).	These	745	
regions	are	well	known	for	their	roles	in	processing	social	information	(Amodio	and	Frith	746	
2006;	Behrens	et	al.	2009;	Hurlemann	et	al.	2010;	Apps	and	Tsakiris	2013;	Blair	2013;	Gu	et	747	
al.	2015;	Lockwood	et	al.	2015;	Apps	et	al.	2016).	Neuroimaging	studies	have	also	shown	748	
that	the	VmPFC	processes	information	about	the	value	of	rewards	that	others	will	receive	749	
and	is	engaged	by	the	value	of	monetary	rewards	donated	to	charity	and	when	enforcing	750	
social	norms	(Krajbich	et	al.	2009;	Cooper	et	al.	2010;	Hare	et	al.	2010;	Tricomi	et	al.	2010;	751	
Baumgartner	et	al.	2011;	Buckholtz	and	Marois	2012;	Janowski	et	al.	2013;	Zaki	et	al.	2014;	752	
Apps	et	al.	2015).	In	addition,	there	is	considerable	evidence	that	lesions	to	the	VmPFC,	and	753	
structural	changes	to	this	region	in	healthy	individuals,	are	linked	to	antisocial	behaviour	and	754	
influence	the	extent	to	which	people	conform	to	social	norms	(Blair	2013;	Gu	et	al.	2015;	755	
O’Callaghan	et	al.	2016).	Our	results	therefore	go	against	the	viewpoint	that	the	VmPFC	does	756	
not	process	social	information	(Rudebeck	et	al.	2008)	and	support	emerging	evidence	that	757	
this	region	may	play	an	important	role	in	processing	value-related	information	during	social	758	
interactions.		759	
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Recently	studies	have	examined	the	processing	of	value	in	a	context	where	the	beneficiary	760	
of	the	value-guided	choice	was	either	the	subject	themselves,	or	another	individual.	Sul	et	761	
al.,	(2015)	suggested	that	when	choosing	to	benefit	either	ourselves	or	another,	when	the	762	
choices	are	based	on	our	own	preferences,	more	ventral	portions	of	the	mPFC	encode	value	763	
for	ourselves	but	more	dorsal	portions	signal	value	for	other	people	–	although	this	differs	764	
between	prosocial	and	selfish	individuals.	In	contrast,	Nicolle	et	al.,(2012)	and	Garvert	et	al.,	765	
(2015)	found	that	value	was	coded	in	an	‘offline’,	modelled	frame	of	reference	in	more	766	
dorsal	portions	of	the	mPFC	and	in	a	more	‘online’	executed	frame	of	reference	in	the	767	
VmPFC.	That	is,	the	VmPFC	coded	the	value	of	rewards	according	to	whoever	might	receive	768	
the	outcome	of	a	decision,	whereas	the	DmPFC	signalled	value	according	to	the	preferences	769	
of	the	person	who	would	not	receive	the	reward	on	that	trial.	Our	results,	however,	do	not	770	
fully	support	either	viewpoint.	Our	results	support	the	suggestion	that	DmPFC	is	specialised	771	
for	processing	social	information,	as	argued	by	Sul	et	al.,	(2015),	but	would	not	support	their	772	
claim	that	the	VmPFC	processes	rewards	only	when	they	are	subjectively	valued.	Likewise,	773	
we	did	not	find	evidence	to	strongly	support	the	claim	that	the	findings	of	Garvert	et	al.,	774	
(2015)	and	Nicolle	et	al.,	(2012)	that	the	DmPFC	and	VmPFC	encode	value	in	an	offline	and	775	
online	reference	frame	respectively.		776	
How	can	we	reconcile	these	previous	studies	findings	with	our	results?	One	possible	777	
explanation	is	that	there	is	a	substantial	difference	in	the	nature	of	decisions	that	conform	778	
to	norms	compared	to	decisions	made	that	benefit	another.	Specifically,	when	making	779	
normative	decisions	an	individual	is	both	the	beneficiary	of	the	choice	and	decisions-maker,	780	
whereas	when	choosing	for	others	the	individual	is	not	the	beneficiary	of	the	outcome.	This	781	
key	distinction	in	the	frame	of	reference	for	the	beneficiary	of	the	choice	may	explain	why	782	
we	do	not	find	similar	results.	In	addition,	it	is	also	plausible	that	our	results	are	referring	to	783	
different	regions	of	the	mPFC	from	those	of	Sul	and	colleagues	and	Nicolle	and	colleagues.	784	
Specifically,	our	results	extended	across	a	large	portion	of	the	mPFC	(areas	8,9,32	and	11),	785	
whereas	the	distinctions	identified	in	previous	studies	refer	to	a	smaller	circumscribed	786	
region	potentially	restricted	to	distinctions	within	areas	32	and	area	9.	Thus,	our	results	787	
extend	these	previous	findings	by	examining	regions	that	extend	over	a	larger	spatial	extent	788	
of	the	mPFC.	Moreover	our	findings	highlight	the	contributions	of	several	mPFC	regions	to	789	
making	decisions	based	on	a	social	norm	guided	valuation	are	somewhat	distinct	from	the	790	
contributions	made	when	making	decisions	to	benefit	another.	791	
	792	
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Lastly,	could	these	results	be	accounted	for	by	differences	in	the	memory	demands	between	793	
subjective	and	normative	decisions?	Notably,	we	did	not	find	any	main	effect	differences	in	794	
the	mPFC	when	comparing	activity	time-locked	to	the	offer	cues	on	subjective	or	normative	795	
trials.	This	suggests	that	the	differences	in	activity	in	the	mPFC	related	to	the	discounted	796	
value	of	delayed	rewards	and	not	purely	to	the	requirement	to	recall	a	response	from	797	
memory.	Moreover,	subjects	showed	conformity	to	the	norm	even	on	subjective	trials,	798	
suggesting	that	recall	of	the	norm	was	guiding	behaviour	on	both	subjective	and	normative	799	
trials.	Behaviourally	therefore,	our	results	suggest	that	the	normative	and	subjective	trials	800	
were	comparable	in	terms	of	their	memory	demands.	Finally,	whether	the	dmPFC	processes	801	
information	in	a	domain-general	way	(i.e.	is	engaged	by	memory	processes	including	those	802	
that	are	socially	relevant)	or	processes	exclusively	social	information	is	a	question	that	has	803	
been	examined	extensively	in	social	neuroscience.	There	is	considerable	debate	over	804	
whether	parts	of	the	mPFC	operate	in	a	domain-general	or	socially	specific	manner	(Amodio	805	
and	Frith	2006;	Izuma	2013),	and	whether	operating	in	larger	social	groups	was	an	806	
evolutionary	pressure	for	greater	memory	capacity	and	the	expansion	of	the	prefrontal	807	
cortex	(Dunbar	and	Shultz	2007).	Theoretical	accounts	also	directly	link	the	evolution	of	the	808	
mPFC	to	the	requirement	to	process	increasingly	abstract	rules	about	how	to	interact	with	809	
others	(Murray	et	al.	2016)	and	prefrontal	cortex	development	is	linked	to	the	degree	to	810	
which	social	influence	changes	behaviour	through	ageing	(Steinberg	and	Monahan	2007;	811	
Steinberg	2008;	Tamnes	et	al.	2017).	To	base	one’s	behaviour	on	recalled	information	rather	812	
than	one’s	own	preferences	may	therefore	be	a	fundamental	aspect	of	social	norm	guided	813	
behaviour	and	a	key	mechanism	underlying	the	functional	properties	of	the	mPFC.	The	issue	814	
of	whether	information	processing	in	the	dmPFC	is	exclusively	‘social’	in	nature,	or	is	a	more	815	
domain-general	process,	cannot	be	resolved	by	this	study	alone.	However,	crucially	either	of	816	
these	possibilities	does	not	contradict	our	key	argument,	that	the	neural	mechanisms	817	
underlying	subjective	valuations	may	be	different	than	those	that	underlie	the	social	norm	818	
recalled	valuations.	819	
In	summary,	we	have	identified	three	zones	in	the	mPFC	that	process	value-related	signals	820	
but	each	has	a	different	profile	for	processing	subjectively	or	normatively	valued	rewards.	821	
Our	results	highlight	some	of	the	key	neural	and	computational	mechanisms	that	may	822	
underpin	reward	valuation	and	social	influence.	Moreover,	this	may	pave	the	way	for	823	
understanding	why	people	can	make	much	more	impulsive	or	patient	economic	decisions	824	
when	interacting	with	others	than	they	would	when	making	the	same	decisions	alone.		825	
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Figure	Legends	1032	
	1033	
	1034	
	1035	
	1036	
Fig.1.	Trial	Structure.	Each	trial	began	with	a	cue	that	indicated	whether	a	choice	should	be	1037	
made	based	on	a	subjective	preference	(“YOU”)	or	normative	(“GROUP”)	valuation.	The	font	1038	
used	throughout	the	trial	was	colour	coded	to	also	indicate	the	trial-type	to	the	participant.	1039	
Following	a	temporal	jitter,	an	offer	cue	indicated	the	magnitude	(£3.10	-	£20)	and	delay	1040	
(1day	–	180days)	that	was	on	offer	on	the	trial.	On	each	trial	subjects	were	required	to	1041	
evaluate	whether	they	would	prefer	this	offer	or	a	fixed	baseline	of	(£3)	following	no	delay.	1042	
Following	another	temporal	jitter	subjects	were	required	to	indicate	their	response	by	1043	
making	a	button	press	on	a	keypad.	To	avoid	activity	at	the	time	of	the	offer	cue	being	1044	
confounded	by	preparatory	motor	activity,	which	button	corresponded	to	taking	the	delayed	1045	
offer	(“wait”)	or	the	immediate	offer	(“now”)	varied	randomly	on	each	trial.	1046	
	1047	
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Figure	2.	Behavioural	Results.	Subjects	devalued	rewards	as	a	function	of	temporal	delays.	1048	
As	 delays	 increased	 subjects	 were	more	 likely	 to	 choose	 the	 immediate	 option	 (A)	 and	 as	1049	
rewards	 increased	 they	were	more	 likely	 to	 take	 the	delayed	option	 (B).	Overall	 choices	on	1050	
the	 inter-temporal	 choice	 trials	 were	 better	 explained	 by	 a	 hyperbolic,	 rather	 than	1051	
exponential	model	(C).	(D)	Subjective	or	normative	discount	parameters	estimated	based	on	1052	
the	 subjects	 choice	 behaviour	 did	 not	 differ	 from	 the	 normative	 discount	 factor	 that	 was	1053	
learnt	during	training	 (dotted	blue	 line).	Subjective	discount	 factors	 in	 the	scanning	session	1054	
correlated	with	subjective	discount	factors	during	the	training	before	subjects	had	learnt	the	1055	
normative	 behaviour	 (E).	 However,	 there	 were	 substantial	 shifts	 in	 subjective	 discount	1056	
factors	 from	 before	 to	 after	 learning	 the	 norm	 (F).	 73%	 of	 subjects	 discount	 factors	 were	1057	
closer	 to	 the	 norm	 after	 learning	 normative	 preferences	 during	 training,	 suggesting	 they	1058	
were	influenced	by	the	social	norm	based	preferences.	Error	bars	depict	standard	error	of	the	1059	
mean	 (SEM).1060	
	1061	
Figure	3.	Subjective	and	Normative	value	in	mPFC.	Different	profiles	of	response	to	SV	and	1062	
NV	in	different	mPFC	sub-regions	at	the	time	the	options	were	evaluated.	Clusters	in	anterior	1063	
regions	 of	 the	 DmPFC	 -	 	 areas	 9	 (A)	 and	 8	 (B)	 -	 	 showed	 a	 significant	 negative	 effect	 of	1064	
Normative	 value	 (NV)	on	 the	normative	 trials	but	no	effect	of	 Subjective	 value	 (SV)	on	 the	1065	
subjective	 trials.	Plots	 show	 response	 from	 the	peak	voxel	 (responses	of	 the	whole	 clusters	1066	
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are	 reported	 in	 supp.	 fig.2).	 Clusters	 in	 the	VmPFC	 -	 	 areas	 32	 (C)	 and	11	 (D)	 -	 	 showed	a	1067	
significant	negative	effect	of	NV	on	the	normative	trials	and	a	significant	positive	effect	of	SV	1068	
on	the	subjective	trials.	A	region	in	the	posterior	DmPFC	showed	a	significant	conjunction	(E),	1069	
signalling	both	SV	and	NV	and	no	difference	between	the	two.	Thus,	the	mPFC	is	sensitive	to	1070	
reward	valuations	in	inter-temporal	choice.	Error	bars	depict	SEM.	Results	are	shown	at	p	<	1071	
0.001	uncorrected	for	display	purposes.		1072	 	1073	
